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One of the main focus areas of the Centre forChild Law is the promotion of the principlethat the imprisonment of child offenders
must always be a measure of last resort. To this end
the Centre started an investigation to determine how
many children who were under the age of 18 when
they committed the crime, are serving a sentence of
life imprisonment. Persons who may have been
below the age of 18 at the time of the offence were
interviewed, and records of those court proceedings
examined.
It was found that 32 such prisoners are currently
serving life sentences.1 Of the 32 prisoners, 17 are in
KwaZulu Natal, three in the Free State, three in the
Eastern Cape, four in Mpumalanga, one in North
West and four in Gauteng. Some of them were as
young as 14 and 15 when they committed their
crimes.
Sentencing children to a term of life imprisonment is
in contradiction with the constitutional principle of
imprisonment as a measure of last resort and only
for the shortest appropriate period of time.2 The
Constitution also places an obligation on courts to
interpret our common law in accordance with
international law.3 Furthermore, South Africa has a
long history of case law in which the principle is
firmly established that youth is always a mitigating
factor and that children cannot be measured against
the same standards as adults. 
When looking at the number of children sentenced
to life imprisonment one has to question why this is
happening. Are their crimes extraordinary to such
an extent that it justifies a deviation from
established common law and from our obligations
in terms of international law?
International law
The principle of imprisonment as a measure of last
resort and only for the shortest appropriate period of
time is included in various international documents
and treaties. This constitutional imperative is
reinforced by the principles of proportionality and
rehabilitation with regard to child offenders and
replaces more retributive principles.
The most important treaty is the Convention on the
Rights of the Child of 1989 (hereafter the CRC).
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The main principle when sentencing children is that imprisonment should be a measure of last resort and only
for the shortest appropriate period of time. However, contrary to international and foreign law in this regard,
South Africa continues to sentence children to life imprisonment. The aim of this article is to contrast our
current sentencing practices with regard to life imprisonment for children, with the sentencing principles set
out in South African common law and in international law. Furthermore, the article sets out the negative
effects of a mandatory life sentence in terms of the minimum sentences legislation.
Article 37 of the CRC states that:
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
of punishment. Neither capital punishment,
nor life imprisonment without possibility of
release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years
of age;
(b) ...The arrest, detention or imprisonment
of a child ... shall be used only as a measure
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time.
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Justice (the Beijing Rules) stress
that the principle of proportionality and the
wellbeing of the juvenile should be the guiding
factors during sentencing. Imprisonment should
only be imposed when there is “no other
appropriate response” and “shall be limited to the
possible minimum”.4
The principle of imprisonment as a measure of last
resort is reiterated in guideline 46 of the UN
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines). Furthermore,
the best interests of the young person should
always be of paramount importance.
The UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of their Liberty makes it clear from the
outset in rule 2 of its Fundamental Perspectives that
deprivation of liberty must be limited to
exceptional cases and early release must be a
possibility.
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child (hereafter the ACRWC) does not expressly
include the principle of imprisonment as a measure
of last resort nor does it have a section prohibiting
life imprisonment for children. It does, however,
state that the ‘essential aim’ of juvenile justice shall
be the reformation, reintegration into family and
social rehabilitation of the child.5 This implies that
life imprisonment is not appropriate since it is not
consistent with the main objective of release and
reintegration of the child into the community.
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Practice in other countries 
Canada
In 2002 Canada enacted the Youth Criminal Justice
Act which states very strongly that children may
only be sent to prison if there are no other
appropriate alternatives, and that imprisonment may
only be imposed for violent offences, in exceptional
cases when there are aggravating circumstances, or
when there is a pattern of convictions against the
child. Judges must consider alternatives such as a
combination of imprisonment and correctional
supervision before direct imprisonment.
If direct imprisonment is the only appropriate
sentence, the maximum period of imprisonment is
seven to ten years, depending on whether it was first
or second-degree murder. The period to be served
continuously before becoming eligible for parole is
six and four years respectively.6 The Act therefore
removes the possibility of a life sentence for
children.
England and Wales
In England and Wales, it used to be the case that
children who were convicted of serious violent
offences for which adults would be sentenced to life
imprisonment, were sentenced to be detained
‘during Her Majesty’s pleasure’. Such a child would
be eligible for release when it was recommended by
the parole board in consultation with the trial judge
and the Lord Chief Justice, but the final power to
release the child was vested in the Secretary of 
State. 
In practice, the trial judge would recommend a
minimum period to be served, which was confirmed
or varied by the Lord Chief Justice before being
relayed to the Secretary of State. However, there was
no statutory provision mandating or requiring the
trial judge to set a minimum period of imprisonment
and it was at the discretion of the Secretary of State
whether the child should be released, even if the
parole board recommended release. 
This practice resulted in a situation where children
imprisoned ‘during Her Majesty’s pleasure’ were
being treated the same as persons serving a
mandatory life sentence.7
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The European Court of Human Rights found that
this practice violated the European Convention on
Human Rights.8 In particular, it was found that it
was cruel and inhuman punishment to detain
children without any certainty about when they
might be released. The situation was exacerbated
by the possibility that the Secretary of State might
veto a recommendation for early release from the
parole board. 
The legislation was amended and the trial judge
must now set the minimum period of time that must
be served, after which the child must be considered
for parole and early release. If the parole board
recommends release, the Secretary of State must
release the child.9
Germany
German legislation relating to the imprisonment of
children is specifically based on the Beijing Rules
and states that the administration of child justice is
based on the principles of ‘minimum intervention’
and prison as a sanction of last resort. For very
serious crimes such as murder and rape, children
between the ages of 14 and 17 may be sentenced
to a maximum of ten years. Furthermore, sentences
must always run concurrently and may never run
cumulatively.10
Australia
In Australia each state has its own criminal and
sentencing legislation but in general, Australia is
one of very few countries that still holds the
possibility of life imprisonment for children in its
current legislation.11 Legislation in New South Wales
states that mandatory life sentences do not apply to
persons below the age of 18;12 however, trial judges
still have the power to impose a discretionary life
sentence.
The Young Offenders Act of 1997, in the same state,
created a very intricate system of sentencing for
serious violent offences, allowing a judge to
sentence a child to imprisonment for a period to
end within six months of the child turning 21. In a
recent shocking and particularly vicious case of
racially motivated murder and assault, a 17 year-old
offender was sentenced in this way to three and a
half years’ imprisonment.13 This seems to indicate
that the Young Offenders Act will act as a guideline
for sentencing instead of having a discretionary life
sentence imposed.
Africa
In Uganda a child may not receive a sentence of
detention for a period exceeding three years when
convicted of a crime that for adults is punishable by
death. This is according to the Children’s Statute of
1996, which also incorporates the principle of
imprisonment as a measure of last resort.14
One of the basic children’s rights enshrined in the
Children’s Act 8 of 2001 of Kenya states that no
child may be subjected to life imprisonment.15
When reading the chapter on child justice it
becomes clear that Kenya does not allow
imprisonment of children at all. At worst, children
are sentenced to reform or borstal schools.16
In Lesotho, no person below the age of 18 may be
imprisoned unless there are substantial and
compelling reasons and imprisonment may never
be longer than 15 years. Furthermore, the
Children’s Protection Act of 1980 also states that
imprisonment is a measure of last resort and for the
shortest appropriate period of time.
According to the Namibian Constitution no person
under the age of 16 may be imprisoned.17 However,
they have indicated in a report to the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child that they do
allow life imprisonment for children.18
The South African experience
Historically both the courts and legislature always
made a distinction between adults and children
when it came to the sentencing of very violent and
serious crimes. According to the Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917, a judge could
use his discretion to impose any other sentence
than the death penalty when sentencing a person
below the age of 16 who had been convicted of
murder.19
In 1955 the phrasing was amended to give the
judge the discretion to impose any sentence other
than the death penalty when it was found that there
were extenuating circumstances.20 In 1959 the
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the offenders was 14 at the time and the court of
appeal found that the sentence of ten years’
imprisonment was shockingly inappropriate and
that he should instead be sent to reform school.
Impact of the minimum sentences legislation
Minimum sentences were introduced in 1997
through section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act 105 of 1997. The Act created a sentence of
mandatory life imprisonment, to be imposed when
a person is convicted of a crime listed in Part I of
Schedule 2 of the Act, unless there were substantial
and compelling reasons to justify deviating from the
minimum sentence.28 Minimum sentences do not
apply to persons below the age of 16, but if a
presiding officer wants to impose a minimum
sentence on a 16 or 17 year-old s/he may do so,
provided that the reasons for doing so are
recorded.29
This section led to widespread confusion about
whether minimum sentences automatically apply to
children who were 16 or 17 when they committed
the crime, in the same way that they apply to
adults. Before the death penalty was abolished there
was a clear legal distinction between adults and
children, but when the death penalty fell away and
minimum sentences were introduced, it appeared
that children and adults were in an equal position
before the law. This may explain why children were
receiving as harsh a sentence as life imprisonment.
The basic rule is that imprisonment should be a
measure of last resort for child offenders. Minimum
sentences are not a measure of last resort, they are
a measure of first resort, and do not allow an
individualised approach to sentencing as required
by international law.
The question was resolved in 2004 in the case of 
S v B30 in the Supreme Court of Appeal, where it
was held that minimum sentences and specifically
life imprisonment do not automatically apply to
children of 16 or 17. The court emphasised that the
traditional aims of punishment must be re-evaluated
in light of the Constitution and international law
relating to child offenders, including the principles
of rehabilitation, proportionality and the best
interest of the child. 
minimum age of 16 was raised to 18 by the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 16 of 1959. This
continued to be the position in South Africa until
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990
removed the death penalty for persons below the
age of 18.21
As far back as 1908 in R v Jantjies,22 the court found
that a fitting sentence for a 12 year-old boy who
had murdered his friend, was a sentence of two
years in reform school. In S v Whitehead 23 the court
found that a sentence of 22 years amounts to life
imprisonment and that a more appropriate sentence
for a 17 year-old would be 15 years. The court
opined that any term of imprisonment of almost 25
years should only be imposed in the most
exceptional circumstances, and was very unusual in
our law.
In S v Maimela24 the trial court convicted a 16 year-
old boy of murder, and found that there were no
extenuating circumstances that would justify
imposing any other sentence than the death penalty.
On appeal the court found that, even though age
may not always be a mitigating factor when the
offender is under the age of 18, it must always be
taken into account when the court is exercising its
discretion with regard to the death penalty. The
court has to examine to what extent the
youthfulness of an offender under the age of 18
makes the death penalty inappropriate. 
In the famous ’scissors’ murder case, S v Lehnberg,25
the judge found that being young means being
immature, lacking life experience, being reckless,
and is a mental state in which one is very easily
influenced. Furthermore, you cannot measure
children against the same standard used for adults.
Although Lehnberg was also about when it would
be appropriate to impose the death penalty, it has
become the locus classicus on youth as a mitigating
factor and has been followed consistently in
subsequent judgements.26
Even when there were severe aggravating
circumstances did the court exercise leniency due
to youthfulness. In S v Willemse,27 an 84 year-old
woman was repeatedly raped, stabbed and
eventually thrown into a well on her farm. One of
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According to the trial transcripts, most of the
children serving life were sentenced between the
time that minimum sentences were introduced,
and 2004. It is therefore conceivable that the
incidence of children being sentenced to life
imprisonment may decrease now that the Supreme
Court of Appeal has clarified the law. 
It is however discouraging that records were found
of children who were 14 or 15 when they
committed a crime, and were sentenced to life
imprisonment in terms of the court’s common law
jurisdiction.
Impact of the Correctional Supervision Act 111 of
1998
A further problem is that there is no mechanism
that provides for the early release of children who
were sentenced to life imprisonment. Article 37 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child only
prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility
of release. Life imprisonment without the
possibility of release does not exist in South 
Africa, but a person serving life must serve 25
years before he or she may be considered for
parole.31
The legislation in this regard makes no distinction
between adults and persons who were below the
age of 18 when they committed the offence.
Although it is not without the possibility of release,
it is clearly not for the shortest appropriate period
of time and it also neglects to take the principles
of rehabilitation, individualised sentencing and
best interests of the child into account.
Conclusion
The Child Justice Bill, which was introduced to
parliament in 2002, prohibits life imprisonment for
any person under 18 and focuses on diversion,
non-custodial sentences and restorative justice
(see the previous article on the Bill in this issue).
Another possible solution to limit the imposition of
life imprisonment on child offenders, is to amend
the minimum sentences legislation to completely
exclude all persons below 18, or at least create a
mechanism whereby persons who were below the
age of 18 when they committed the crime may
become eligible for early release.
Life imprisonment should only be imposed when a
person poses a threat to society and cannot be
rehabilitated. Sentencing a child to life
imprisonment means that we no longer recognise
that their youthfulness contributed to reckless and
immature behaviour and that such behaviour can
be corrected through rehabilitation. This flies in the
face of constitutional values and international law. 
The reasons why we have to make exceptions for
young offenders were well summarised by a
Canadian criminal court judge:
Their degree of responsibility and
blameworthiness is less because of their
immaturity, their susceptibility to negative
influence, and their natural tendency to
impulsive ill-considered behaviour. Further,
youthful offenders possess greater potential
for rehabilitation because their character is
not well formed and there is a greater
chance that deficiencies can be corrected.
These factors lead to the accepted
conclusion that youth sentencing should be
less severe than for adults and that the
emphasis should be placed on
rehabilitation.32
Endnotes
1 Findings according to information sent by the office of 
the Inspecting Judge of Prisons in 2005.
2 Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter “the
Constitution”).
3 Section 39 op cit.
4 Rule 17.1(b). Notably the commentary to rule 17.1(b) 
explains that retributive sanctions may have some
merit in cases of severe offences by children but
“should always be outweighed by the interest of
safeguarding the well-being and future of the young
person”.
5 Article 17(3) of the ACRWC.
6 Section 42 Youth Sentences of the Youth and Criminal 
Justice Act of 2002.
7 D A Thomas, Sentencing: Detention during Her 
Majesty’s pleasure – Offender convicted of murder
committed when under 18, Criminal Law Review,
2001, p 839.
8 Hussain v The United Kingdom (1996) EHRR 1. A
subsequent amendment to the Crime (Sentence) Act
1996 stated that the Secretary of State must set the
minimum period to be served. If the parole board
recommended release after this period had been
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 17 SEPTEMBER 200618 DU TOIT
served the Secretary had no discretion in the matter
and was obliged to release the child. This section was
also found to be against the European Convention on
Human Rights. T v The United Kingdom (2000) 30
EHRR 121. The Secretary of State is part of the
executive branch of government and the exercise of a
judicial function was found to violate the principle of
separation of powers.
9 Parliament enacted section 61 of the Criminal Justice 
and Court Services Act 2000 which inserted section
82A into the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing)
Act 2000. Section 53 of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933 was consolidated as section 90 of
the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
10 German Juvenile Justice Act of 1990.
11 Human Rights Watch, The death penalty and life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release for
child offenders who were less than 18 years of age at
the time of their offence, and juvenile justice models
of rehabilitation, Commission on Human Rights, 62nd
Session.
12 Section 61 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
of 1999.
13 R v MD [2005] NSWCCA p 342.
14 Section 94(1)(g) and 94(4) of the Children’s Statute of 
1996.
15 Section 18 of the Children’s Act 8 of 2001.
16 Op cit Section 190 and 191.
17 Section 15(5) of the Constitution of Namibia.
18 Initial Report of the State Parties due in 1992: 
Namibia 22/01/93 CRC/C/3/Add.12.
19 Section 338 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Act 31 of 1917.
20 Criminal Law Amendment Act 56 of 1955.
21 The death penalty was declared unconstitutional in 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) and
subsequently abolished by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
22 1908 22 EDC 382.
23 1970 4 SA 424 (A).
24 1976 2 SA 587 (A).
25 1975 4 SA 553 (A).
26 Followed in S v Tshisa en ‘n ander 2003 1 SACR 171 
(O) S v Willemse 1988 3 SA 836 (A).
27 1988 3 SA 836 (A).
28 Schedule 2 of Part I lists the crimes for which a person 
convicted of such a crime must receive a sentence of
life imprisonment. Crimes include murder which was
planned or premeditated, rape of a girl under 16 or
when the accused raped the victim repeatedly or
when the victim was raped by more than one accused
in the furtherance of a common purpose.
29 Section 51(3)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
105 of 1997.
30 S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA).
31 Section 73 of the Correctional Supervision Act 111 of 
1998.
32 R v L (D) 2005 ONCJ 386 at para 20.
